Iran-U.S. Confrontation Appears Closer as Military Buildup Grows Despite Diplomatic Deadlock

Political Desk: The alarm bells of war are ringing once again. From a private meeting of senior members of Donald Trump’s cabinet at Camp David to the deployment of a third U.S. aircraft carrier to the Middle East and the deadlock in Iran-U.S. negotiations, a series of developments point to the possibility of another round of direct confrontation.

Trump has repeatedly said in recent weeks that the war will end “very soon” and “probably immediately after the midterm elections,” suggesting that the statement may have been made with some operational calculations behind it. At the same time, Trump’s rhetoric and the diplomatic deadlock are reminiscent of the days before the start of the large-scale U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, when the political environment oscillated between military threats and diplomatic efforts.

Now, too, talks between Tehran and Washington have reached an impasse while the U.S. military presence in the region is being reinforced. However, these developments alone do not establish that a final decision to launch another attack has been made.

U.S. Military Presence Grows in the Middle East

The most significant recent military development is the deployment of the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier to the Middle East and the movement of the USS Makin Island amphibious assault group. According to published reports, these deployments could bring the U.S. presence in the region to three aircraft carriers and two amphibious ready groups, adding thousands of military personnel. Some reports estimate that between 9,000 and 10,000 additional troops with ground-operation capabilities could be deployed.

An aircraft carrier, however, can serve multiple purposes, including deterrence, force protection, support for ongoing operations or giving the U.S. president additional military options. These forces are being deployed at a time when negotiations have made little progress and the November 4 midterm elections are approaching.

Axios also reported that senior U.S. national security officials met at Camp David on Friday under the chairmanship of Vice President JD Vance to discuss the next steps in the war and developments in Yemen. According to the report, the meeting resembled another gathering held in June 2025, just days before Israel launched its attack on Iran.

What Would Be the Objective of a New Round of Strikes?

The central question surrounding another attack is what Washington would seek to accomplish this time.

During the previous 12-day war and the subsequent 40-day war, the United States and Israel targeted a broad range of Iranian military facilities. A Washington Post analysis of satellite imagery found that during the first four weeks of the operation, at least 29 missile-launch sites and four major ballistic-missile production facilities had been damaged.

Energy infrastructure was also not spared. A Reuters report in April indicated that more than 40 major energy facilities in Iran and other countries in the region had been damaged. Strikes on Kharg Island, southern Iranian facilities and regional energy infrastructure caused major disruptions in oil markets.

During the 40-day war, even many important law-enforcement facilities in Iranian cities were targeted and destroyed.

If the objective of the previous attacks was to weaken Iran’s nuclear, missile, air-defense and broader military capabilities, a new attack would face a fundamental problem: a significant portion of the known targets have already been struck, yet they did not cause a fundamental disruption to Iran’s missile and drone capabilities.

As a result, a new operation could potentially expand the scope of targets from military infrastructure to economic and critical civilian infrastructure. Trump has also repeatedly threatened to target Iran’s civilian and energy infrastructure.

Attacking Energy Infrastructure Would Be a Double-Edged Sword

Attacking energy infrastructure, however, would be a double-edged sword for Washington because it would invite an Iranian response.

So far, retaliatory attacks on oil facilities in the Gulf states and the situation around the Strait of Hormuz have directly affected global energy markets. Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried roughly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flows.

These consequences had already prompted the Group of Seven, even before the possible resumption of the war, to coordinate the release of 100 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products from emergency reserves. The release is scheduled to take place over four months, with a significant share of petroleum products entering the market during the first weeks.

The move indicates, on the one hand, that the United States and its allies are preparing for continued disruption to energy markets. On the other hand, it highlights the significant economic costs that an expanded war could impose on the United States and Europe. A large-scale attack on energy infrastructure would therefore involve not only Iran and regional countries, but also European and Asian economies.

Is Iran Preparing for War?

Iran, meanwhile, appears to be preparing for a repeat of the previous scenario.

Reuters, citing three senior Iranian officials and another informed source, reported that Iranian military commanders are considering a broader response if large-scale U.S. attacks resume.

According to the report, the potential targets could extend beyond facilities directly linked to the United States and could include countries supporting Washington’s military operation as well as targets outside the Middle East.

The Washington Post had previously reported, based on satellite imagery, that Iranian attacks on U.S. facilities in the region had caused significant damage.

Why Do the Midterm Elections Matter?

The U.S. midterm elections are another important variable, which some analysts also highlighted following the Islamabad understanding.

Trump has said that the war will probably end “immediately after the elections.” This could mean that the U.S. administration intends to maintain economic and military pressure until then and subsequently move toward an agreement. Alternatively, it could mean that, once electoral considerations become less restrictive, the administration may have greater room to pursue a larger military action.

If Republicans manage to retain control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, Trump would have greater political room to maneuver in pursuing the war. Even if Republicans lose the elections, however, the transition period would extend until January, meaning Trump could still decide to launch another military operation during that period.

At the same time, reports indicate that there are disagreements within the Trump administration over how the war should continue, with some officials concerned about the military costs and the possibility of a prolonged conflict.

A Washington Post report in August also raised concerns about declining stocks of certain U.S. long-range missiles and interceptor systems, although Trump has repeatedly denied such reports.

Are Back-Channel Communications Still Underway?

Despite all these signs pointing toward the possibility of another war, diplomacy has not disappeared.

Iranian officials have reportedly made proposals through intermediaries in recent weeks for an end to the war and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, while Tehran continues to emphasize a diplomatic solution. Trump, despite rejecting some Iranian proposals, has also acknowledged at times that contacts through intermediaries are continuing.

However, the United States now has greater military capacity at its disposal, while the maritime blockade is gradually producing effects on Iran’s economy, most visibly through the continued rise in the prices of foreign currencies, including the U.S. dollar and euro.

Yet a new war would also carry costs for the United States and its allies. After 40 days of fighting, doubts have emerged even inside the United States over whether the attacks have achieved their intended objectives.

The key question, therefore, is whether the United States will be willing to bear greater economic and military costs after the congressional elections for a third phase of the war, or whether it will instead allow the current attritional pressure to continue until Iran’s economy is fully squeezed before taking further military action.